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ANTI-PREFERENCE IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
ALLEN

I.

R. KAMPt

INTRODUCrION

There recently have been proposals to ban preferences for
an individual group based on factors such as race, sex, or color.'
They would add a ban on preferences based on these categories
to the already existing ban on discrimination. Characterized as
being anti-affirmative action, these proposals have been debated
in terms of their constitutionality and desirability. There has
been no discussion, however, as to mundane legal questions such
as who has standing and how to prove a case under anti-preference legislation.
This Article will analyze these proposals and basic legal
questions. Making the assumption that the courts will use the
present models of disparate treatment and disparate impact as
they do now under anti-discrimination law, this Article will discuss ways to prove that an illegal preference has taken place.
This Article finds that such statutes could radically change present law on employment and educational selection in unforeseen
ways. Many now-current practices as diverse as favoring one's
lover, hiring co-ethnics for a small ethnic firm, and admitting legacies into college could be illegal. It concludes that the proposals
make an unstated and erroneous assumption that anti-preference
rules are anti-affirmative action practices, which they often are
not, and that anti-preference and anti-affirmative action equals a
merit selection system, which it does not.
II.

THE PROPOSALS

The two main anti-affirmative action proposals have been
the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI) and a federal bill
proposed by Senator Bob Dole.
t Professor of Law John Marshall Law School. J.D. University of Chicago,
1969; M.A. University of California at Irvine, 1967; A.B. University of California at

Berkeley, 1964. I would like to thank Professor Yvette Barkdale for her assistance.
1. California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209) passed. Carla Hall,
UCLA Students Feel the Tensions of Prop. 209, L.A. TIMS, Nov. 10, 1996, at Al.
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No one, however, has focused on the language of the referendum or the Dole Bill. In fact, it is very difficult to obtain the
actual language of the CCRI. News stories just call it the "antiaffirmative action measure" without including its text. My research assistant had to make five phone calls to California's State
Assembly to get a copy of the Referendum. 2 It is as follows:
§31. (a) Neither the State of California nor any of its
political subdivisions or agents shall use race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for either discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group in the operation of the State's system of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.
(b) This section shall apply only to state action taken after the effective date of this section.
(c) Allowable remedies for violation of this section shall
include normal and customary attorney's fees.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting classifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the State's system of public
employment or public education.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court order or consent decree which is in force as of
the effective date of this section.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting state action which is necessary to establish or maintain
eligibility for any federal program, where ineligibility would
result in a loss of federal funds to the State.
(g) If any part or parts of this section are found to be in
conflict with federal law or the United States Constitution, the
section shall be implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the United States Constitution permit. Any provision held invalid shall be severable from the remaining
portions of this section.
Senator Dole's Bill provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the
Federal Government nor any officer, employee, or department
or agency of the Federal Government
(1) may intentionally discriminate against, or may grant a
preference to, any individual or group based in whole or in
part on race, color, national origin, or sex, in connection with
(A) a Federal contract or subcontract;
(B) Federal employment; or
(C) any other federally conducted program or activity;
2. California Civil Rights Initiative, Assembly Constitutional Amendment No.
2, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1994).
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(2) may require or encourage any Federal contractor or
subcontractor to intentionally discriminate against, or grant a
preference to, any individual group based in whole or in part

on race, color, national origin, or sex; or
(3) may enter into a consent decree that requires, autho-

rizes, or permits any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) or

(2).
"Grant a preference" is defined as "use of any preferential
treatment and includes but is not limited to any use of a quota,
set-aside, '3numerical goal, timetable, or other numerical
objective."
The Dole Bill, however, does provide that the ban on preference will not prohibit recruiting to expand an applicant pool,4nor
does it extend to historically black colleges and universities.
Inspired by CCRI, legislators have introduced similar state
bills in California (as legislation), Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky,
Michigan, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and Texas.5 The various bills mostly follow the language of the
California model. The interesting variations include the California legislation's personal liability on educational employee "for
an injury caused by the failure of the officer or employee to enforce this chapter. '' 6 The Kentucky and Michigan versions add
religion to the prohibited categories; Michigan also adds "age,
sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status."' 7 Would
this outlaw married student housing? Washington includes "status as a sexual minority." 8 Evidently, it would be legal to prefer
someone who belonged to a "sexual majority." The Texas bill
would ban preferences only after reparations have been awarded
to "African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic Americans,
and women." 9 Only the Washington proposal would mandate a
merit system. 10
3. S. 1085, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(2) (1995).
4. It at §8 3-4.
5. Cal. A.B. 833, Reg. Sess. (1995-96); Del. H.B. 114, 138th Gen. Assembly,
Reg. Sess. (1995-96); Ill. S.B. 1184, 89th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995-96); Ky.
S.B. 275, Reg. Sess. (1996); Mich. H.B. 4972, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995); Mo. S.B.
873, 88th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1996); N.Y. A.B. 6466, 219th Gen. Assembly,
Reg. Sess. (1995); Penn. H.B. 360, 179th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995-96); S.C.
H.B. 3812, S.C. (1995); Tex. H.J.R. 117, 74th Leg. (1995).
6. See Cal. A.B. 833, supra note 5, § 66132.
7. See Mich. H.B. 4972, supra note 5, 88 102(1), 202(1)(a).
8. See Wash. H.B. 2244, 54th Reg. Sess. § 101(1) (1995-96).
9. See Tex. H.J.R. 117, supra note 5, § 3b.
10. See Wash. H.B. 2244, supra note 8, § 203. The department of personnel
shall develop merit systems of employment for state agencies under the provisions
of Section 201 of this act, that include altering a civil service system of employment
to include such provisions and establishing new merit systems of employment for
state agency employees who are not employed under a civil service system of employment. The department of personnel shall provide guidance to units of local gov-
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ANTI-PREFERENCE VERUS ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Reading the texts of the California and Federal proposals
shows that they do not ban affirmative action per se, rather, they
ban preferences based on the suspect categories. What CCRI
would do is to ban preferential treatment, which is not now illegal per se. On a constitutional level, the Supreme Court's latest
case on affirmative action, Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena,"

only ruled that federal racial classification that favors a racial
group "must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must
be narrowly tailored to further that interest.' 2 Such strict scrutiny does not always invalidate racial classifications:
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' . . .The unhappy persistence
of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortugovernment is not disqualified from acting in
nate reality, and
13
response to it.

What is illegal now is discrimination against someone, not preferring someone.14 The proposals would give a different and new
cause of action; plaintiffs would be able to sue, not only because
ernment in developing merit systems of employment described under Section 201 of
this act.
11. 115 U.S. 2097 (1995).
12. Id.at 2117.
13. Id.
Justice Scalia, however, would apply an even more rigorous standard. He writes
in concurrence:
I join the opinion of the Court, except Part IIl-C, and except insofar as
it may be inconsistent with the following: In my view, government can
never have a compelling interest: in discriminating on the basis of race in
order to "make up" for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.
See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,520, (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment). Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution there
can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is
alien to the Constitution's focus upon the individual, see Amdt. 14, §1
("I[N]or shall any State... deny to any person" the equal protection of the
laws) (emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on race, see
Arndt. 15, §1 (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote "on account of
race") or based on blood, see Art. III, §3 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall
work Corruption of Blood"); Art. I, §9 ("No Title of Nobility shall be
granted by the United States"). To pursue the concept of racial entitlement
- even for the most, admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery,
race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one
race here. It is American.
It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would
survive under this understanding of strict scrutiny, but I am content to
leave that to be decided on remand. Id. at 2118-2119.
14. See, e.g., § 703(a) of Title VII reads: It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
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they suffered discrimination, but also because someone else was
preferred.
The proposals reject any distinction between classifications
burdening groups and those benefiting such groups. This distinction, however, has always been part of our law. The Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, prohibits a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property without due process or denial of equal protectionnot granting someone else a benefit. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, for example, distinguishes between discriminating
against a racial group and granting a group a benefit.15 In equating discrimination and preference, the proposals adopt the position of Justice Thomas in his Adarand concurrence who sees
preference and discrimination as morally and constitutionally
equivalent:
I agree with the majority's conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to all government classifications based on race. I write
separately, however, to express my disagreement with the
premise underlying Justice STEVENS' and Justice GINSBURG's dissents: that there is a racial paternalism exception
to the principle of equal protection. I believe that there is a
"moral [and] constitutional equivalence," between laws
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits
on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of
recequality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only
16
ognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.
One example illustrates the difference in treatment between
preference and discrimination under present law. Today, some
law suits arise out of the "paramour" situation in the employment discrimination field. The boss favors his lover with promotions and raises and the other employees sue. However, these
plaintiffs rarely win under Title VII because most courts hold
that Title VII does not prohibit sexual favoritism, just sexual discrimination. Michael J. Phillips, in The Dubious Title VII Cause
of Action for Sexual Favoritism,17 explains the courts' reasoning:
In De Cintio, seven male respiratory therapists complained
that they had been unfairly disqualified from promotion to a
higher position so that the administrator making the promotion could elevate a woman with whom he was having a consensual romantic relationship. In rejecting their Title VII
claim, the court began by noting that Title VII forbids discrimconditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin....
Note that neither the California proposal nor the Dole bill bans preferences based on religion. Supra notes 2-3.
15. 438 U.S. 265, (1978); see Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2108-14.
16. Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
17. 51 WASH. & LEE L.REv. 547 (1994).
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ination based on gender, but not discrimination based on sexual activity irrespective of gender. In all the cases in which
Title VII sex discrimination liability has been found, it continued, 'there existed a causal connection between the gender of
the individual or class [claiming relief] and the resultant preference or disparity.' Here, however, the plaintiffs 'were not
prejudiced because of their status as males; rather, they were
discriminated against because [the administrator] preferred his
paramour. [The plaintiffs] faced exactly the same predicament
as that faced by any woman applicant for the promotion.
[A]lmost all courts considering the sexual favoritism issue
the idea that Title VII
have followed De Cintio by rejecting
8
forbids sexual favoritism as such.'

In situations involving two groups, where discrimination
against one is necessarily preference for another, the result
would be the same whether the cause of action is for discrimination or preference. Discrimination against one group automatically becomes a preference in another. In E.E.O.C. v.
Consolidated Service Systems, 19 for example, the E.E.O.C.
brought an action against a company which hired Koreans 81%
of the time, where the available work force was at most 3% Korean.20 There, where Korean hires were compared to all nonKorean hires, 21a hire of one Korean would mean one less nonKorean hired.
In other cases, focusing on preference for one group of employees may give a result different from that obtained by focusing on discrimination against a group. In Allen v. City of
Chicago,2 laid-off employees claimed that a city reorganization
had laid-off African Americans, Latinos, those over 40, and opponents of Mayor Daley in disproportionate percentages. The
court denied class action status, stating "plaintiffs have not set
forth facts alleging that they have suffered as a result of a single
employment policy practice of general application." 23 The plaintiffs were then faced with the difficult prospect of proving up individual cases of discrimination. However, viewed in the light of
preference, the plaintiffs' case is that non-Latino whites, who are
under forty and who support Mayor Daley, are being favored. If
this were illegal, there can be a plaintiff class of all non-favored
24
employees and the case becomes much easier to prove.
18. Idl at 559.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id at 235.
Id.
828 F.Supp. 543 (N.D. Il1. 1993).
Id at 553.
See generally id
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BRINGING AN ACTION FOR PREFERENCE

Who Has Standing to Sue?

Both proposals provide for private rights of action. Unlike
an action for discrimination, I assume that those directly affected
by the prohibited acts could not sue as they are the ones preferred. My conclusion, however, assumes that Justice Thomas'
views are not adopted. If they were, members of minority groups
harmed by paternalistic government programs in being victims of
attitudes of superiority or of resentment, or who have developed
dependencies or attitudes of entitlement, perhaps would have
standing to sue. To him, programs that benefit one race constitute pernicious paternalism:
But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as
any other form of discrimination. So-called "benign" discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government's use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may
cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are "entitled" to preferences. 25
I, however, assume those arguably harmed, that is, those not
preferred by the preferential action, have a cause of action. How
much harm caused by the preferences need be shown? Various
cases have discussed whether the burden on those harmed by affirmative action programs is necessary or sufficient to invalidate
those programs. In general, the cases differentiate between situations where the burdens felt are general and spread out over a
large population as opposed to those where the burdens fall on
particular individuals or unsettle "legitimate expectations." A
Justice Department Memorandum on Adarand summarizes the
cases:
In some situations, however, the burden imposed by an affirmative action program may be too high. As a general principle,
a racial or ethnic classification crosses that threshold when it
'unsettle[s] ... legitimate firmly rooted expectation[s],' or imposes the 'entire burden.., on particular individuals.' Applying that principle in an employment case where seniority
difference between minority and nonminority employees were
involved, a plurality of the Court in Wygant stated that racebased layoffs may impose a more substantial burden than
25. Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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race-based hiring and promotion goals because "denial of a
future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an
existing job." In a subsequent case, however, Justice Powell
warned that "it is too simplistic to conclude that hiring [or
other employment] goals withstand constitutional muster
whereas layoffs do not... The proper constitutional inquiry
focuses on the effect, if any, and the diffuseness of the burden
imposed on innocent nonminorities, not the label applied to
the particular employment plan at issue."
In the contracting area, a racial or ethnic classification would
upset settled expectations if it impaired an existing contract
that had been awarded to a person who is not included in the
classification. This apparently occurs rarely, if at all, in the
federal government. A more salient inquiry therefore focuses
on the scale of the exclusionary effect of a contracting program .... Similarly, an affirmative action program that effectively shut nonminority firms out of certain markets or
industries might establish an impermissible
particular
26
burden.
The question then becomes: How definite a harm must be
experienced before one can sue on the basis of preference? For
example, let us take a pool of one hundred employees composed
of ten equally divided ethnic groups. Ten are promoted to middle management of which eight of those promoted are Wisians. I
assume that now all non-Wisians have a cause of action for nonpromotions due to illegal preference. My conclusion, of course,
is debatable. Would a plaintiff have to show that he or she definitely would have been promoted if the Wisians were not?2 7 Was
that finding necessary?
B. ProceduralIssues
1.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

At present, a plaintiff seeking to sue under Title VII, the
Americans with Disabilities Act,2 8 or the Age Discrimination
Employment Act, 29 must exhaust complicated state and federal
pre-suit administrative requirements. A party must first fie a
charge with the E.E.O.C. or with a state fair employment practice agency.3 0 Suits against the Federal government differ from
those against private employees, but a complicated procedure
26. Walter Dellinger, Memorandum to General Counsels, Daily Labor Report,
June 28, 1995, at E-1, E-9 (citation omitted).
27. Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2102.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. (1990).

29. 29 U.S.C. § 621, et. seq. (1967).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 706-07 (1991).
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must be followed. 31 States frequently have established administrative procedures to adjudicate claims of discrimination.32
Both the California and Dole Bill proposals provide for lawsuits that are not subject to the administrative filing requirements. Thus, they act as mechanisms for circumventing these
procedures. A plaintiff who wishes to bypass the present procedures could just recast his or her action from "discrimination"
into "preference" and obviate any necessity of administrative filing or consideration.
2. Jury Trial
Another procedural issue is the right to a jury trial. The
Dole Bill attempts to limit federal preference actions to equitable
relief only, thus depriving the plaintiff of a jury. The Supreme
Court, however, has never decided whether or not a claim for
back pay under Title VII gives a party the Seventh Amendment
right to a trial by jury. The question was made moot by the Civil
33
Rights Act of 1991, which provided for compensatory damages.
The Dole Bill would again raise this issue.
Class Actions
Under current class action doctrine in equal employment
law, members of a class have to suffer the same injury. The
Supreme Court has stated:
If petitioner used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both
applicants for employment and incumbent employees, a class
action on behalf of every applicant or employee who might
have been prejudiced by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). Significant proof that an employer operated under a general policy
of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested itself
in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion,
such as through entirely subjective decision making processes.
In this regard it is noteworthy that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract policy of discrimination. The mere fact that an aggrieved private plaintiff
is a member of an identifiable class of persons of the same
race or national origin is insufficient to establish his standing
to litigate on their behalf all possible claims of discrimination
against a common employer? 4
3.

31. E.g., under Title VII, a federal employee must file with his or her agency's
E.E.O.C. counselors. 29 C.F.R. § 1612 (1995).
32. E.g., University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1977(A) (1991).
34. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15
(1982).
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If the standard is "discrimination," then each group has to
prove a discriminatory practice directed at it; if it is "preference,"
everyone not in the preferred group can join together to attack
the practices that produced the preference.
C. Proving a Case for Preference in Hiring
I assume here that the law of proof of preference actions will
parallel that of discrimination and that the cases will divide into
two groups, those involving disparate treatment and those involving disparate impact. Of course, future cases may not follow
the models used in anti-discrimination statutes, but I am making
a working assumption that they will.
The difference between "treatment" and "impact" is ex35
plained in Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S.:
'Disparate treatment' such as is alleged in the present case is
the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences
in treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most
obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from
claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact theory. Either36theory may, of
course, be applied to a particular set of facts.

1. Disparate Treatment
(a) Admissions of Preferences
Employers may just state that they prefer a certain group, in
the same way that they now can make explicitly discriminatory
remarks. In Price Warehouse v. Hopkins37 for example, partners
of an accounting firm had evaluated the plaintiff, a woman, in
terms of sexual stereotypes. One told her to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. 38 The Court ruled
that "[t]he plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied
on her gender in making its decision. In making this showing,
35. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
36. Id at 335 n.15 (citation omitted).
37. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
38. Matat 235.
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can certainly be evidence that gender
stereotypical remarks
39
played a part.1
Under the current law, explicit statements of preference may
not necessarily constitute discrimination. In Consolidated,Judge
Posner even stated that there was a preference for Koreans, but
that it did not constitute illegal discrimination:
No inference of intentional discrimination can be drawn from

the pattern we have described, even if the employer would
prefer to employ people drawn predominantly or even entirely
from his own ethnic or, here, national-origin community. Discrimination is not preference or aversion; it is acting on the
preference or aversion. If the most efficient method of hiring,
adopted because it is the most efficient (not defended because
it is efficient-the statute does not allow an employer to justify
intentional discrimination by reference to efficiency, just happens to produce a work force whose racial or religious or ethnic or national-origin or gender composition pleases the
employer, this is not intentional discrimination. The motive is
not a discriminatory one.40
Judge Posner concludes with a lyrical description of the
small ethnic firm. It is at least arguable that such firms would be
guilty of "preferential" hiring under the language of the California and federal proposals:
In a nation of immigrants, this must be reckoned an ominous
case despite its outcome. The United States has many recent
immigrants, and today as historically they tend to cluster in
their own communities, united by ties of language, culture,
and background. Often they form small businesses composed
largely of relatives, friends, and other members of their community, and they obtain new employees by word of mouth.
These small businesses - grocery stores, furniture stores,
clothing stores, cleaning services, restaurants, .gas stationshave been for many immigrant groups, and continue to be, the
first rung on the ladder of American success. Derided as clannish, resented for their ambition and hard work, hated or despised for their otherness, recent immigrants are frequent
targets of discrimination, some of it violent. It would be a bitter irony if the federal agency dedicated to enforcing the antidiscrimination laws succeeded in using those laws to kick these
people off the ladder by compelling them to institute costly
systems of hiring. There is equal danger to small black-run
businesses in our central cities. Must such businesses undercostly measures to retake in the name of nondiscrimination
cruit nonblack employees? 4'
39. Id. at 251.
40. Consolidated,989 F.2d at 236.
41. Id. at 237-38.
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What would have happened if the E.E.O.C. had put Mr.
Hwang, the owner of Consolidated Service Systems, on the stand
and asked him the following: if he liked Koreans; if he thought
they were hard-working; if he thought they made good employees; and whether he was more comfortable with a four-fifths Korean work force? Under an anti-preference regime, a "yes"
answer may win the case. Compare E.E.O.C. v. 0 & G Spring
and Wire Forms Specialty Company,42 in which the district judge
found discrimination in a case involving an ethnic (Polish) employer. Reaching the opposite conclusion from Chicago Miniature and Consolidated, the district court judge found that the
word-of-mouth recruitment practice had a disparate impact on
African Americans. With a "preference" based statute, many
more cases would come out the same way as 0 & G.
(b)

StatisticalProof

In employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff can use statistics to prove disparate treatment. In Int. Brotherhood of
Teamsters, for example, the plaintiff proved its case by showing
that the defendant had employed few African Americans and
Hispanics, even though the company's terminals were located in
areas of substantial African American populations. 43 Under a
preference-based equal employment law, statistical evidence
could be a powerful tool in the hands of a plaintiff. Common
experience tells us that certain jobs contain disproportionate percentages of one race, religion, sex, ethnic group, or nationality.
In the words of Justice O'Connor, "it is completely unrealistic to
assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent unlawful
discrimination." 44
During my twenties, I worked on construction crews that
consisted primarily of African Americans, Chicanos, and Appalachian Whites; more of my fellow law professors are Jewish than
statistics would predict. Such disproportions in employment may
be due to both legitimate and illegitimate causes. The disparity
may be based on such legitimate factors as a group's cultural
preference for certain types of jobs (e.g., my Scandinavian relations' preference for craft work). On the other hand, people prefer, often unconsciously, to promote people who are similar to
42. 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994).
43. Int. Brotherhoodof Teamsters, 38 F.3d at 336-41. See, e.g., 0 & G, 431 U.S.
at 876.
44. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Worker's International Association v. E.E.O.C.,
478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986).
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themselves. 45 Racial, gender, religious, and ethnic stereotypes
thus can cause one group to be discriminated against or to be
preferred over another.
In any case, plaintiffs under a preference regime could sue
and use any group's disproportionate rate of success as part of its
case. Frequently, it is white males who are more successful than
others. In universities "[w]hite men continue to be the only beneficiaries of 'affirmative action,' the only group who are hired at
rates significantly higher than their proportion in the available
pool of qualified candidates." 46 The preference initiatives could
be used to attack the success of that group.
In one situation of statistical proof, the substitution of a
preference model would make the plaintiff's case much easier to
prove. An employer may not discriminate against any one group
but obviously prefer a single group. Imagine an employee pool
that is eligible for promotion, made up of Roman Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, African Americans, Whites, Hispanics, and Asians, of various ethnicities and national origins,
including Northern, Southern and Eastern Europeans, who are
male and female, and of all ages between thirty and fifty. An
employer could promote in such a way as to pick a few percentage points less than chance would indicate from the non-preferred groups.
A member of such a group, say a Roman Catholic of Italian
origin who is a fifty-year old male, may have an impossible time
of proving discrimination. There may well be no overt evidence
of discrimination (e.g., no ethnic slurs) and courts generally require a gross statistical disparity to prove discrimination. Generally, courts require a showing that the plaintiff's group is at least
two standard deviations away from that produced by chance. 47
If the focus is on preference, however, the plaintiff's case
may be transformed from a loser to a winner. Let us say that
although no group is discriminated against, it turns out that out
of ten white male Episcopalians or Presbyterians of Northern
European descent, eight were promoted, where chance would
yield one. The nation's top CEOs are disproportionately Presbyterian and Episcopalian. One study showed that where the two
denomimations make up two percent of the population, a combined percentage of thirty three percent of CEOs are Presbyte45. See Tracy Baron, Keeping Women out of the Executive Suite: The Courts'
Failureto Apply Title VII Scrutiny To Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. Rv. 267, 271
(1994).
46. Martha West, GenderBias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failureto Protect
Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L.Q. 67, 70 (1994).
47. Id.at 149. The requirement derives from Hazelwood School District v. U.S.
433 U.S. 299 (1978).
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nan or Episcopalian. Although it is hard to prove a case of
discrimination in CEO employment against any particular group,
it is easy to prove preference; e.g., Presbyterian and Episcopalian
white males of Northern European ancestry are promoted at a
statistically significant level. 48 Now the employer has to explain
this preference. Furthermore, the Italian Roman Catholic male
can be joined by all the other non-preferred groups in a class
action to attack the preference.
(c)

CircumstantialEvidence

A plaintiff can also prove discrimination by circumstantial
evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green49 laid down the
sequence of proof:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of com50
plainant's qualifications.
The plaintiff then must "be afforded a fair opportunity to
show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection
was in fact a pretext."'5 1 The fact-finder can consider such facts
and circumstances as:
petitioner's treatment of respondent during his prior term of
employment; petitioner's reaction, if any, to respondent's legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner's general policy
and practice with respect to minority employment. On the latter point, statistics as to petitioner's employment policy and
practice may be helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent in this case conformed to
a general pattern of discrimination against blacks. 52
In a preference action, the focus would be on the person
preferred. Translating Green, in terms of anti-preference law,
may lead to something like the following as constituting plaintiff's prima facie case:
(i) the preferred person (e.g., the person who was promoted
over plaintiff) belongs to a preferred group;
48. DAvIo L. KURTZ ET AL., CEO: WHo
(1989).
49. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

GETS TO THE Top IN AMERICA

50. Id.
at 802.
51. li at 804.
52. ld. at 804-05.
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(ii) that plaintiff and the person who was promoted were
both qualified; and
(iii) that despite the equal qualifications, the preferred person was promoted.
Circumstantial evidence could include the employer's past
treatment of the preferred person and the employer's general
policy and practice with respect to the preferred group. Furthermore, statistics could be used to establish a general pattern of
preference.
2. DisparateImpact
Another way of proving an equal employment opportunity
case is through the "disparate impact" model, in which an employer's practice, neutral on its face, has a disparate impact on a
particular group. Requiring a high school diploma, for example,
may have a disparate impact against African Americans and thus
be an act of illegal discrimination.5 3 The employer then has the
burden of proof "that the challenged practice is job related for
54
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.
Do the anti-preference proposals adopt a disparate impact
theory? The Supreme Court has avoided ruling on disparate impact in the field of affirmative action. Adarand explicitly did not
decide anything relating to disparate impact.5 5 Further, Justice
Scalia has stated that a preference for small businesses would be
constitutional even if it would have a racially disproportionate
impact.5 6 If one did not use a disparate impact model, however,
one could easily circumvent the intent of the anti-preference proposals. The University of California, for example, could just prefer certain geographical locations such as East Los Angeles.
Admissions made by employers could lead to proving a prohibited preference due to disparate impact. In O&G's dissent,
for example, Judge Manion argues that the lack of an English
fluency requirement may well have explained the death of African American employees because they would have been uncomfortable in an environment where Polish and Spanish were
spoken.5 7 But why allow employees to speak Polish on the job?
The plaintiff could use the non-requirement of English as evidence of a preference towards Polish and Latino workers. The
opposite, requiring fluency in standard English, may also be used
to prove a preference. Such a provision could have the disparate
53. See, e.g. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1991).
55. Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2105.
56. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
57. O&G, 38 F.3d at 888 (Manion, J., dissenting).
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impact of preferring white, native-born English speakers. This
puts the employer in a bind, as pointed out by Justice Blackmun
in his Concurring opinion upholding affirmative action in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber,58 where he
states that banning affirmative action would put the employer on
a "tightrope." The employer could not discriminate, but it would
also have "to eschew all forms of voluntary affirmative action.
Even a whisper of emphasis on minority recruiting would be forbidden. '59 Putting together a ban on preferential hiring with disparate impact theory would indeed put employers on such a
tightrope.
Statistics could be used to prove a disparate impact; Wards
Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio 60 sets out a statistical disparateimpact case:
'[P]roper comparison [is] between the racial composition of
[the jobs at-issue] and the racial composition of the qualified
...population in the relevant labor market.' It is such a comparison-between the racial composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue
jobs-that generally forms the proper basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate-impact case. Alternatively, in cases where
such labor market statistics will be difficult if not impossible to
ascertain, we have recognized that certain other statisticssuch as measures indicating the racial composition of 'otherwise-qualified applicants'
61 for at-issue jobs-are equally probative for this purpose.
Putting the concepts of disparate impact theory, statistics,
and preference together might make illegal many common practices. Take that of preferring "legacies" in college admissions.
Prestigious colleges frequently give preferential admissions to
children of alumni.62 The policies were developed in reaction to
Jewish applicants; and resulted in preferences for the white and
affluent. 63 Would such practices now be banned as preferring
certain races and ethnic groups?
58. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
59. Id at 210-11.
60. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
61. Id. at 650-51 (citation omitted).
62. West, supra note 46, at 142., n.302.
"For more than forty years, 20% of Harvard students have been admitted
as 'legacies,' children of Harvard alumni."
Professor West cites John Larew's findings: "[a]ccording to Larew, at
Yale University, alumni's children are two and a half times more likely to
be admitted. In 1991, Dartmouth admitted 57% of its legacies and 27% of
other applicants. In 1990, University of Pennsylvania admitted 66% of applicants who had an alumni parent. Stanford's rate of admissions for legacies is twice the rate for the 'general population' of applicants."Id at 178
n.303 (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 142 n.302.
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AND MERIT

Banning preferences has been equated with ending affirmative action. The American Bar Association Journal, for example,
under the heading "Affirmative Action: Have Race - And Gender
- Conscious Remedies Outlived Their Usefulness?" states: "Next
year, California voters may be considering an initiative that
would bar preferential treatment on the basis of race or sex in
public education, government employment and the awarding of
public contracts."' 64 Another ABA article terms the referendum
'65
as "an initiative to eliminate affirmative action in California.
However, the California and federal proposals actually do
not affect many affirmative action practices. For example, take
the practice of broadening the applicant pool. Is a law school
that contacts its African American and Asian alumni for names
of qualified applicants indulging a preference or is it just broadening its applicant pool? The Justice Department's statement on
Adarand concludes that Adarand does not apply to such "outreach" programs:
Mere outreach and recruitment efforts, however, typically
should not be subject to the Adarand standards. Indeed, postCroson cases indicate that such efforts are considered raceneutral means of increasing minority opportunity. In some

sense, of course, the targeting of minorities through outreach
and recruitment campaigns involves race-conscious action.
But the objective there is to expand the pool of applicants or
bidders to include minorities, not to use race or ethnicity in
the actual decision. If the government does not use racial or
expanded
ethnic classifications in selecting persons from the
66
pool, Adarand ordinarily would be inapplicable.

Affirmative action can also be viewed as a correction for
prior discrimination. In United Steelworkers, the Court approved
an affirmative action plan where it was adopted "to break down
old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." 67 United States
v. Paradiseapproved a decree that ordered that at least fifty percent of the state troopers promoted be African American. The
decree was justified on the ground that "[t]he Government un64. Lino A. Graglia, Affirmative Action: Have race - and gender - conscious remedies outlived their usefulness?, 81 A.B.A. J. 40 (May 1995).
65. Arleen Jacibius, Affirmative Action on Way Out in Calif., 81 A.B.A.J. 22
(Sept. 1995).
Ellen Ladowsky, writing in the Wall Street Journal,also describes the initiative: "In California, where voters will be asked to cast a ballot on an antiaffirmative-action measure in 1996, early polling suggests that women's
support for the 'Civil Rights Initiative,' as it is called, is almost as strong as
that of white males.... " That's No White Male...., WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
1995, at A20.
66. Dellinger, supra note 26.

67. United Steelworkers, 1443 U.S. at 208.
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questionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and
present discrimination
by a state actor. ' 68 Adarand cites-Para69
dise with approval.
Could it be argued that certain preferences are not prohibited but rather just cures for past discrimination? A similar question: if preferences now can cure past discrimination, could
discrimination cure past preferences? Could an employer, for
example, put a limit on the number of promoted Presbyterians?
Professor West has proposed a limit on university granting tenure
upon hiring to white, heterosexual males in order to cure the historical preference for such individuals. 70 Questions such as these
will take years of litigation to answer.
The proposals, thus, may not ban affirmative action. They
would also not mandate a meritocracy with employment decisions based on quality. Some people have assumed that a ban on
preferences equals a ban on affirmative action, which equals selection on merit. For example, in June of 1995, The New York
Times reported that at the University of California at Berkeley,
forty two percent of the freshman class is Asian-American, while
next year, given the state's new ban on affirmative action, that
number is expected to be approximately fifty five percent. 71 This
assumes that anti-affirmative action means admitting only on numerical criteria.
Anti-discrimination, anti-preference, merit selection, and
admission by the numbers are actually four different concepts.
Professor Michael Selmi points out that the affirmative action debate assumes that "affirmative action means that unqualified, or
lesser qualified, individuals will be selected over more qualified,
individuals." 72
Selmi gives the example of Johnson v. Transporta73
tion Agency:
[A]fter being passed over in the selection process, the plaintiff
in the case, Paul Johnson, alleged that his constitutional rights
were violated because he had scored a 75 on the dispatcher
examination, two points higher than Ms. Joyce's score of 73.
Based on that test score difference, the case reached the
Supreme Court under the apparent assumption that Mr. Johnson was better qualified than Ms. Joyce. Indeed, it appears
that no one ever questioned, or even mentioned that assumption, but it was simply accepted throughout the litigation with68. 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
69. Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2117.
70. West, supra note 46, at 157-58.
71. Peter Applebome, The Debate on Diversity in CaliforniaShifts, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1995, at Al.
72. Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative
Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1251 (1995).
73. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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Yet, it is a rather remarkable conclusion, as
out debate ....
discussed below, that the two-point test score differential
demonstrated Mr. Johnson was better qualified than Ms.

Joyce. 74

There are two reasons why numerical scores do not indicate
merit: the standard error of measurement and the low correlation between test scores and performance. Professor Selmi explains the concept of standard error of measurement:
One way would be to test a particular individual an infinite
number of times with comparable examinations and then to
compute the average of the observed scores. Other than as a
theoretical proposition, this procedure is obviously impossible.
Indeed, it is rare that an individual will be tested more than
once for a particular measurement. There is, however, a statistical method that simulates the procedure described above
which allows one to estimate the parameters, or limits, of an
individual's true score. The statistic is known as the standard
error of measurement, which can be used to identify the range
of scores an individual would likely obtain over repeat administrations of an examination. This range of scores can then
serve as an indicator of where an individual's true abilities lie,
as those abilities are measured by the test, and may be used 75to
avoid placing undue emphasis on a single numerical score.
Thus, because any one test score indicates a range of probable test scores, one cannot say that a test score higher than anthe standard measurement of error, is "better"
other, but within
76
than the other.
Furthermore, there is only a weak correlation between test
scores and job and school performance:
Correlation coefficients are defined on a scale that ranges
from +1.0 to -1.0, with a 1.0 correlation, in absolute value, indicating a perfect relationship inasmuch as by knowing score Y
one can correctly predict criterion X. In other words, if a perfect relationship existed, employers would also be able to predict employees' performance ratings by knowing their test
scores. Based on what has been said so far, it should come as
little surprise that correlation coefficients show test score/job
performance relationships that are far from perfect. What
may come as a surprise, however, is how weak the relationships can be. Correlation coefficients for employment tests
tend to be quite low, with the best tests having correlations of
approximately 0.3. In practical terms, such a low correlation
predictive
means that the examination provides only limited
77
information regarding an applicant's potential.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Selmi, supra note 72, at 1252-53.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1274-75.
Id. at 1263.
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In order to determine how much of the predicted performance is explained by the test, one squares the correlation
coefficient:
We can illustrate the meaning of the correlation by using an
example based on the LSAT. If there is a 0.3 correlation between LSAT scores and first year law school grades, then only
9% of the variance in grade point averages will be explained
by the [SAT scores. This does not mean that there is no explanation for the remaining variance, only that the test does
not provide the explanation. Instead, other factors, such as
study habits, interest in the subject matter, or effort may be
better, or stronger, predictors of first-year grades than the test
itself, and the test may not be capable of measuring these
qualities or may not be structured with an intent to measure
them. If such factors determine success in law school, and the
test fails to measure them, then that test will a fortiori be an
and in some instances a poor, predictor of
incomplete,
78
success.
Thus, the assumption that admitting by rank order of scores
on a test and grades equals merit selection is false. Indeed, rank
order selection could be attacked under a disparate impact rationale, if such tests are shown to prefer any one group. Then the
defendant may, if the current law on discrimination would apply
to preferences, have to show that "the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. ' '7 9 Is it necessary to use the SATs and the LSATs?
The University of California did not use them until 1960.80 An
educational institution could use other criteria for admission.
Underlying the entire debate is an unstated assumption that
merit or objective selection is somehow mandated once affirmative action is ended. However, merit or objective selection is not
required by any law today. What is now prohibited is discrimination; a ban on preferences would not force decision-makers to
affirmatively choose on merit but just add another set of prohibited acts. 8 1 It would be possible, for example, for an employer to
choose randomly from a pool of qualified applicants. Such a
78. Id at 1264.
Correlation coefficients for the LSAT, which is intended to predict
first-year law school grades, tend to hover around .35. The correlations
may not necessarily improve when college grade point averages are included in the predictive calculus, largely because there is often little commonality to grades across schools, or across professors within schools, all of
which can reduce the reliability of college grades as a measure of potential
law school performance. Id. at n.39.
79. Supra note 54.

80. Id.
81. "It is difficult to imagine, after all, that the Constitution requires an employer to make rank order selections." Selmi, supra note 72, at 1314.
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practice would be a quota, but not a preference. If hires were
made randomly from a pool of qualified employees who were
twenty percent Wisian and eighty percent Wusian, then hired employees should be roughly twenty percent/eighty percent Wisian/
Wusian. Although, this is a quota, the employer has not preferred any group. If done federally, would this be a "quota" or
an "other numerical objective" barred by the Dole Bill?8
Moreover, many present selection processes based on supposed "merit" may indeed be illegal as preferences under a disparate impact model. A university, for example, may require a
Ph.D. of persons hired to teach freshman English. It may be that
a particular group, say Wisians, constitute 10% of all college
graduates but forty percent of the Ph.D.s in English. The requirement of the doctorate results in a preference for Wisians.
Nevertheless, is a Ph.D. "consistent with business necessity?"
Do you need a Ph.D. to teach freshman English?
The proposals put decision-makers in a quandary; they cannot discriminate nor prefer. Can they just take those who score
highest on some test? Persons who have low scores may argue
that such practices have an unjustified disparate impact. For example, should the University of California admit students on the
basis of SAT scores? Such a practice may result in a high percentage of Asian students. Is such a practice justifiable? Can
one argue that a student with an LSAT score of 750 will do significantly better or will benefit more from a college education than
a student that scores 650? Allocating admissions to the highest
scoring may also constitute an illegal preference on a disparate
impact analysis. In order to avoid litigation, an employer or admissions director, could just lower the score to a comfortable
level and then just choose randomly among the applicants.
V.

CONCLUSION

When there is no history of discrimination, however, the
proposals would definitely end explicit hiring quotas. They may
well abolish the ethnic employer's preference for his countrymen
and thus reverse Consolidated.
Anti-preference legislation would not give the employers
much room to maneuver. Employers would probably move from
subjective decision-making to a system of decisions based either
on objective, validated job-related criteria or on random selection. Plaintiff's lawyers should love it. Luckily, both the California proposal and the Dole Bill provide for attorney's fees.

82. Supra note 3.
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